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Note
The Curious Case of Disparate Impact Under the
ADEA: Reversing the Theory's Development into
Obsolescence
R. Henry Pfutzenreuter IV*
The recognition of disparate impact liability in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.1 has been heralded as "[t]he single most important Title VII decision, both for the development of the law and
in its impact on the daily lives of American workers."2 The curious thing about disparate impact since becoming a theory of
recovery under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),3 however, is that its availability to victims of age discrimination has narrowed in scope.4 Although the Supreme
Court's decision in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory recently reaffirmed application of the theory to the ADEA,5 it
also secured its practical obsolescence as a valid means of establishing liability for age discrimination. Faced with troubling
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007,
University of Minnesota. I would like to thank the staff and board of the Minnesota Law Review, in particular, Nathan Brennan and Elizabeth Borer, for
their ideas and helpful suggestions; Professor Steven Befort for his help in refining the subject of this Note; and finally, my parents, "Fitz" and Andrea, and
my brother, Ben, each for their constant love and support. Copyright C 2009
by R. Henry Pfutzenreuter IV.
1. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
2. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 23 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 561; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003-04 (2006) (describing the development of the "behavioral realist" movement, which advocates for an
"expansive application of disparate impact theory").
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232
(2005).
4. See Ann Marie Tracey & Norma Skoog, Is Business Judgment a Catch22 for ADEA Plaintiffs? The Impact of Smith v. City of Jackson on Future
ADEA Employment Litigation,33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 231, 263 (2008) (concluding that the future does not appear to "offer much latitude to ADEA plaintiffs').
5. 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05 (2008).
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economic times6 and a rapidly aging American workforce,7 the
importance of providing more than mere lip service to these
claims is apparent now more than ever. In reaffirming the
theory's availability, the Court clarified a central issue for
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs by placing the burden of
proof for articulating the reasonable factor other than age
(RFOA) defense squarely upon the defendant.8 Unfortunately
for victims of age discrimination, the standard emerging from
the Court's earlier recognition of ADEA disparate impact
claims in Smith v. City of Jackson9 already made overcoming
the defense a nearly impossible task. 10
The current level of deference afforded to employers makes
it likely that any factor other than age will be deemed sufficiently reasonable to preclude liability;" therefore, any amount
of cost savings will be a valid justification for an employment
policy's disparate effect upon older employees. 12 Although it has
become clear that the employer's ability to prove the reasonableness of a factor other than age will be the deciding factor in
the outcome of an ADEA disparate impact claim,13 the Court's
repeated articulation of a standard under which the issue will
6. See Job DiscriminationClaims Hit Record, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009,
at B2 ("With the economy in recession and companies shedding millions of
jobs, labor experts suggested that older workers may have suffered a disproportionate hit.").
7. See PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OLDER WORKERS:
EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT TRENDS 2, 5 (2008), http://aging.senate.gov/
crs/pension34.pdf (identifying a workforce comprised of aging individuals who
often desire to continue working and projecting that the number of those individuals will grow steadily over the next two decades).
8. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2405.
9. 544 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2005) (plurality opinion).
10. Perhaps the best indication of the futility of bringing a disparate impact claim under current standards is that the Court chose to articulate the
availability of the theory in a case where the plaintiffs were unable to prevail.
See id. at 243.
11. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 263 ("[C]ourts are likely to consider favorably, and even dispositively, the rationale and approach of the
business judgment rule in disparate impact employment ADEA discrimination
cases.").
12. See Lee Franck, Note, The Cost to Older Workers: How the ADEA Has
Been Interpreted to Allow Employers to Fire Older Employees Based on Cost
Concerns, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1415-20 (2003) (discussing cases where cost
has been upheld as a valid RFOA).
13. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404-05 (placing the burden to prove the
RFOA defense on the employer); Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing how an employer's rationale for firing decisions will be a deciding factor for ADEA claims).
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almost never reach the trier of fact is problematic, to say the
least.14
A crippled theory of disparate impact under the ADEA
leaves millions of aging American workers susceptible to the
perils of economic turbulence and uncertainty. During such
times, employers may mistakenly come to believe they have
strong incentives to cut costs by terminating employees based
on their age. 15 The theory of disparate impact is unique in its
ability to provide recovery in the absence of smoking-gun intent,16 as will often be the case during a discriminatory reduction-in-force wherein an employer can use any number of factors as effective proxies for age.17 When employers engage in
practices that disparately affect older workers and provide unfair windfalls for themselves, reliance on factors other than age
are not reasonable. If the Court's rulings in Smith and Meacham are to have any practical significance, it is necessary to
analyze the RFOA defense in a new light.
This Note argues for a departure from the current level of
deference afforded to employers. Following from the premise
that the viability of a defendant's RFOA lies in an evaluation of
its reasonableness, it proposes a familiar balancing standard
from tort liability, Judge Hand's B < PL formula, 18 be used to
14. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240-41 (explaining that relief under
the ADEA based on disparate impact theory is limited in two significant ways:
the RFOA exception and the Court's prior holding in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655-61 (1982), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), which narrowed the scope of disparate impact
claims).
15. See DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE AGING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 15 (2008), http://www.doleta.gov/reports/FINAL

TaskforceReport_2-11-08.pdf ("[S]ome employers may over-estimate the costs
associated with employing older workers while simultaneously underestimating the benefits."); Michael Luo, Longer Periods of Unemployment for Workers
45 and Older, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at All (discussing how the economy
can force companies that are "reluctant to lose the experience of older workers" to nevertheless fire them due to cost concerns).
16. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparateimpact theory.").
17. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kohrman & Mark Stewart Hayes, Employers Who
Cry 'RIF'andthe Courts that Believe Them, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 153,
160-63 (2005) (discussing how the bias against older workers because of their
salaries, known as "wage bias," serves as a proxy for age bias).
18. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
("[Ilf the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.").
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assess this element of the defense. Application of the formula
would ask the trier of fact to make a modified balancing assessment, determining whether the burden that would have
been imposed upon an employer forgoing the employment action in question (B), outweighs the magnitude of potential discrimination (L), discounted by its probability (P). Such a standard would compel an objective evaluation of reasonableness
and shift focus from misplaced inquiries into intent, mental
culpability, and mens rea-like requirements normally associated with criminal liability. Judge Hand's cost-benefit assessment is well within the province of the trier of fact. A court
need only permit litigants to produce the evidence that would
allow it to perform such a function. Permitting parties to introduce the evidence necessary to evaluate an employer's RFOA
defense using the B < PL formula for disparate impact claims
under the ADEA would provide a fair and effective means for
older workers to secure their rights during these troubling economic times.
Part I of this Note explains the turbulent history of disparate impact claims under the ADEA, foreshadowing the rather
curious present-day unavailability of the remedy despite its
recognition by the Supreme Court. Part II analyzes the ways in
which this unavailability stems from the degree of deference afforded to employers under the RFOA exception, and how this
trivial threshold is ill-equipped to address the unique economic
concerns of the nation's aging workforce, as well as the nature
of age discrimination itself. Finally, Part III proposes that the
trier of fact should be permitted to consider the evidence necessary to assess an employer's RFOA under Judge Hand's B < PL
formula. It argues that this revised standard would be consistent with the fundamental premise of antidiscrimination law as
a form of tort liability, coincide with a modern understanding of
age discrimination's operation at an implicit level, and address
the urgent economic concerns facing older workers.
I. HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA
The road to recognition as a theory of recovery under the
ADEA was a turbulent one for disparate impact. The initial reluctance of courts to grant disparate impact plaintiffs under the
ADEA the same rights as under Title VII,19 however, is consis19. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("[Tihere are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry
over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.").
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tent with the Supreme Court's more recent holdings reinforcing
employers' powerful shield from liability-the RFOA defense. 20
Beginning with the legislative history of the ADEA itself, this
Part provides the chronological backdrop for analyzing this significant obstacle to the ready availability of disparate impact
under the ADEA.
A. THE BEGINNINGS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: TITLE
VII AND THE ADEA

Passage of the ADEA followed shortly after the adoption of
Title VII. Both Title VII and the ADEA were passed as a result
of the Civil Rights Movement-in 196421 and 1967,22 respectively. Since Title VII failed to address adequately age discrimination, Congress commissioned a report to study its effects. 23
The findings of that study, known as the Wirtz Report, 24 played
a central role in the legislative history of the ADEA. 25
The Wirtz Report reached several important conclusions
which would later play a role in the application of disparate
impact claims to the ADEA. 26 First, the Report found that explicit dislike of older individuals was not prevalent throughout
society. 27 Second, the Report identified that employers' assump20. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404
(2008) ("[A]though we are now satisfied that the business necessity test should
have no place in ADEA disparate-impact cases . . . this conclusion does not
stand in the way of our holding that the RFOA exemption is an affirmative
defense.").
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
22. Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4,
81 Stat. 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006)).
23. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) ("Congress did,
however, request the Secretary of Labor to 'make a full and complete study of
the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy
and individuals affected."' (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 715)).
24. W. WILLARD WIRTZ, DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER:
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 21 (1965).
25. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 232-33 ("In response to that report
Congress directed the Secretary to propose remedial legislation and then acted
favorably upon his proposal." (citation omitted)).
26. See id. at 234-35 n.5 ("[Tihere is a remarkable similarity between the
congressional goals we cited in Griggs and those present in the Wirtz Report.").
27. Michael C. Harper, ADEA DoctrinalImpediments to the Fulfillment of
the Wirtz Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1997) ("The Report
found no significant presence of . .. dislike or intolerant feelings about older
workers unrelated to their ability to do work.").
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tions about older employees could result in "statistical discrimination." 28 Third, the Report concluded that facially neutral
practices could have a disproportionate effect on older employees. 29 Finally, the Report found that certain programs designed to aid older employees could actually provide motivation
for employers to discriminate against them. 30 Although judges
and scholars have disagreed about the extent to which the report advocated legislation to remedy these effects, 31 it is clear
that the report identified concern over types of discrimination
that took forms other than explicit intolerance. 32
After considering the study, Congress passed the ADEA.33
The language of the ADEA mirrors that of Title VII in almost
every respect. 34 One significant difference however-the presence of the RFOA exception-would have an important effect
on the future availability of disparate impact claims.3 5 While
Title VII contains a provision exempting adverse employment
actions based on bona fide occupational qualifications
(BFOQ), 3 6 the ADEA goes a step further by limiting liability for
an employer's actions based on "reasonable factors other than

28. Id. at 759 ("The Report[] ... described what economists have termed
'statistical discrimination,' the rejection of all members of a status group because of certain characteristics . . . .").
29. Id. at 761 ("[T]he Report considers a number of ostensibly neutral factors, including health, educational attainment, adaptation to new technology,
and aptitude testing, which may impede the employment of older workers.").
30. Id. ("[T]he Report considers other 'institutional arrangements' which
are 'designed to protect the employment of older workers while they remain in
the work force, and to provide support when they leave it or are ill."' (quoting
WIRTZ, supra note 24, at 2, 15-17)).
31. See, e.g., id. at 762 ("The Report does not recommend that all the practices it lists in the last two categories be condemned by an age discrimination
law.").
32. Id. ("[Tihe Report's discussion of these factors demonstrates a recognition that addressing the aggregate economic and personal impact of the unemployment and underemployment of older workers will require more than
the elimination of overt age-based hiring limits.").
33. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232-33 (2005).
34. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
See also City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 235-36 (plurality opinion) (discussing the
textual and structural similarities between Title VII and the ADEA).
35. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240 ("Two textual differences between
the ADEA and Title VII make it clear that even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-impact theory, the scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII. The first is the [ADEA's]
RFOA provision. . . .").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
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age." 37 As discussed below, the present standard for evaluating
this exception creates an almost insurmountable obstacle for
plaintiffs seeking to recover for disparate impact under the
ADEA.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY:
McDONNELL DOUGLAS AND GRIGGS

Liability under Title VII and the ADEA can be based upon
two distinct theories of proof-disparate treatment and disparate impact. The process for determining liability for disparate
treatment was originally announced by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.38 The basis for a McDonnell
Douglas disparate treatment claim lies in proving intentional
discrimination.39 A plaintiff seeking to recover under a theory
of disparate treatment must first establish a prima facie case
by showing membership in a protected class, qualification for
the position, denial of that position, and that the position remained open following that denial. 40 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. 41 Upon production of such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that
the employer's reason was merely a pretext for actual discrimination. 42
Alternatively, a Title VII or ADEA plaintiff can prove discrimination under a theory of disparate impact. Disparate impact differs from disparate treatment by offering the opportunity for recovery without direct proof of discriminatory intent.4 3
Disparate impact claims were first made available to plaintiffs
in the Supreme Court case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 44 Griggs
was a Title VII case in which an employer had established a
policy that required its employees to either pass a test or have

37. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
38. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden-shifting framework for disparate
treatment claims was further refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-59 (1981).
39. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 804.
43. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977).
44. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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a high school diploma. 4 5 Although this policy was applied
equally to all employees, and thus facially neutral, it had the
effect of disqualifying a disproportionate number of black employees from the position. 46 The Court held that a plaintiff need
not meet the traditional requirements for a showing of disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas so long as the employee could prove that the employer's action had a disparate
impact upon employees belonging to a protected class. 47 The
Court stated that unless the employer could show that its actions were justified as a "business necessity," it would be liable
under Title VII.48 The reasoning behind its decision was that
the purpose of Title VII was to remedy all forms of discrimination, not just explicit intolerance49-a justification similarly expressed in the legislative history of the ADEA.50
C. INITIAL CHALLENGES TO DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY:

WARDS COVE AND HAZEN PAPER
A major hurdle to disparate impact plaintiffs presented itself in 1989 when the Supreme Court chose to significantly
narrow the scope of the theory in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. 51 The plaintiffs in Wards Cove alleged that the employer's subjective decision-making practices resulted in a disparate
impact on their advancement possibilities. 52 The Court first
held that a plaintiff's prima facie case was insufficient unless it
identified "application of a specific or particular employment
practice that ... has created the disparate impact under attack." 53 Thus, it was not enough for a plaintiff to identify a statistical disparity; a plaintiff would also have to point to the specific practice she alleged was its cause.5 4 The Court further
limited disparate impact claims by redefining the "business ne45. Id. at 427-28.
46. See id. at 430.
47. See id. at 431.
48. Id.
49. See id. ("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
50. See, e.g., WIRTZ, supra note 24, at 22 (explaining that "to eliminate
discrimination .. . it will be necessary" to address more than "overt acts").
51. 490 U.S. 642, 655-61 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
52. Id. at 648.
53. Id. at 657.
54. Id.
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cessity" standard articulated in Griggs to one of mere "business
justification."5 5 In doing so, the Court held that "there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensible' to the employer's business."5 6 Finally, the Court reconfigured the burdens allocated in Griggs by stating that the
"ultimate burden ... remains with the plaintiff at all times."5 7
The employer would thus only be required to produce evidence
of a "business justification" in order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, rather than persuade the court of the "business
necessity" of its practice.5 8 These holdings combined to create a
significantly more burdensome framework for disparate impact
plaintiffs.
Congress responded to the Court's decision in Wards Cove
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.59 The Act amended
Title VII by restoring the requirements for disparate impact
claims to those initially articulated by the Court in Griggs.60
First, the Act codified definitions of "business necessity" and
"job relatedness" consistent with the Court's rulings prior to
Wards Cove. 61 Additionally, the Act replaced burdens of production and persuasion following a plaintiff's showing of a prima
facie case upon the employer. 62 The Act also eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff identify a specific employment practice responsible for the disparity. 63 Since the Act did not amend
the ADEA, however, uncertainty remained over the availability
of disparate impact to victims of age discrimination. 64
The majority of lower courts initially viewed the holding in
Griggs, combined with Congressional rejection of Wards Cove,
as allowing for disparate impact claims to proceed under the
ADEA.65 Given the textual similarities between Title VII and
55. Id. at 658.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
60. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark,
39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1148-49 (1993).
61.

Id. at 1137-44.

62. Id. at 1137.
63. Id. at 1144-45.
64. Id. at 1104.
65. See Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Resuscitate the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" Defense
and the DisparateImpact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1410 (2004) ("[The
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the ADEA, courts applied the same standards to both Acts.66 As
a result, disparate impact law enjoyed a brief period of uniformity. 6 7 It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins68-a case involving an ADEA disparate
treatment claim-that lower courts began to question the availability of disparate impact under the ADEA.69 The threemember concurrence in Hazen Paper postulated that there
were "substantial arguments that it [would be] improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the
ADEA."70 Lower courts proceeded along this path despite the
Court's clear statement that it was not ruling on the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 71 A split among
the circuits developed: the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
held that plaintiffs could recover for disparate impact, 72 whereas the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth held that they
could not. 73
D. RECOGNITION OF DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA:
CITY OFJACKSON

It was not until 2005, in Smith v. City of Jackson, that the
Supreme Court settled the circuit split and acknowledged that
plaintiffs could recover for disparate impact under the ADEA. 74
City of Jackson involved a group of police officers who claimed
courts generally applied both the disparate impact and the disparate treatment theory of discrimination to the ADEA before Hazen Paper.").
66. See id. (attributing this phenomenon to the "similarity between Title
VII and the ADEA").
67. See, e.g., Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984); Dace v. ACF
Indus., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
69. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 1415-16 (discussing the effect of Hazen
Paperon lower courts' application of disparate impact to the ADEA).
70. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618.
71. Id. at 610 ("[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact
theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . . and we need not do so
here.").
72. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000);
Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997).
73. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ.
Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
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to have been disparately impacted by their employer's revised
salary plan.7 5 The plan instituted salary increases for officers
with less than five years of tenure.7 6 Unsurprisingly, the plan
disproportionately benefited the younger employees in the department.7 7 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants on the basis that disparate impact claims were
not available under the ADEA, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.7 8
On review by the Supreme Court, a plurality rejected the Fifth
Circuit's holding that a disparate impact claim is unavailable
under the ADEA, but nonetheless concluded that the plaintiffs
in the present case failed to articulate a cognizable disparate
impact claim. 79
Nevertheless, several lines of reasoning were advanced for
allowing disparate impact claims to proceed under the ADEA.
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, analyzed the legislative history and structure of the Act.80 Justice Stevens identified not only the similarities behind the purposes of Title VII
and the ADEA,81 but also emphasized that they were almost
completely identical in their text and structure. 82 The plurality
concluded that its previous decision in Griggs-authorizing
disparate impact claims to proceed under Title VII-would be
"precedent of compelling importance." 83 The plurality, however,
noted one important difference between the ADEA and Title
VII: a provision eliminating liability for acts based on an
RFOA.84 While the Court concluded that this provision supported the availability of disparate impact under the ADEA,
the Court also noted that the textual difference narrows the
Act's coverage. 8 5 Even this statement, taken in light of the
standard articulated for evaluating the defense, might be
viewed as underambitious.
One of the concurring opinions took issue with the plurality's drawing of parallels between the ADEA and Title VII. Justice O'Connor, writing this concurrence, argued that ADEA
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241-43.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 240.
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claims were only cognizable when a plaintiff was able to make
a showing of actual discriminatory intent. 86 The ADEA, unlike
Title VII and its revisions under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
only permitted claims of disparate treatment. Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the RFOA provision was "an independent safe
harbor from liability." 87 Justice O'Connor argued that not only
did the text and structure of the ADEA warrant her conclusion,8 8 but the legislative history of the Act supported it as
well.89 Justice O'Connor articulated a view of the Wirtz Report
that indicated conceptual differences between age discrimination and the types of discrimination prohibited under Title
VII.90

Most of the concerns voiced by O'Connor's concurrence
were probably alleviated by the scope of the test articulated by
the plurality. The plurality reasoned that since the ADEA did
not enjoy the same benefits granted to Title VII in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, disparate impact claims under the ADEA
should be governed by the Court's analysis in Wards Cove.9 '
The Court made it clear that an inquiry into the "job relatedness" or "business necessity" of an employer's practice was irrelevant to the outcome of a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA. 92 Instead, the Court identified the RFOA exception as
being the employer's means of exemption from liability. 93 So
long as an employer's action was based on a reasonable factor
other than age, it would not be liable for the action's disparate
impact. 94 Furthering its reliance on Wards Cove, the Court concluded that unlike Title VII, a prima facie case for disparate
impact under the ADEA was incomplete unless it identified a
specific employment practice responsible for the alleged statistical disparity. 95 With the standard of "business necessity"
clearly ruled out, lower courts were left without guidance as to
the proper scrutiny applicable to the defense.9 6
86. Id. at 248 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 252.
88. Id. at 248-53, 256-58.
89. Id. at 253-56.
90. Id. at 258-59.
91. Id. at 240 (majority opinion).
92. See id. at 243.
93. Id. at 240.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 241.
96. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 244 ("[The Court did not address
any protocol for producing evidence in a case involving an RFOA.").
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E. "DEVELOPMENT" OF DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA:
MEACHAM

Although some celebrated the Court's decision in City of
Jackson as a victory for older workers, many observers quickly
recognized the limitations inherent in the plurality's holding.97
One key issue was allocation of the burden for proving the
RFOA exception. 98 Was it necessary for the employee to prove
the unreasonableness of the employer's RFOA, as might be
suggested under the Wards Cove framework? 99
Or, consistent with traditional affirmative defenses, was it
the employer who had to persuade the court of its RFOA?100
The Court in City of Jackson did not clarify how the RFOA exception fit into the Wards Cove framework. What is more, it
was not readily apparent that the Wards Cove framework was
still the correct framework within which to assess these
claims.10 1 Accordingly, the Court granted certiorari in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratoryto determine the allocation of the burden of proving the RFOA defense. 102
In deciding Meacham, the Court reaffirmed the availability
of disparate impact to ADEA plaintiffs.103 More importantly the
Court adopted the view, consistent with the government's amici
briefs and the views of the EEOC, that an employer bears the
burden of proving the RFOA as an affirmative defense. 104 The
Court rejected the concerns of the defendant's amici, making a
point of identifying the significant hurdles that remained for
97. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Disparate Impact or Negative Impact?:
The Futureof Non-Intentional Discrimination Claims Brought by the Elderly,
13 ELDER L.J. 339, 359 (2005) ("[S]ome journalists and other commentators
claimed that the case was a 'boon' for age discrimination claims. Such proclamations are, at best, overstated.").
98. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 261-62 ("A final fly in the ointment for plaintiffs is the question of whether a plaintiff will need to show affirmatively that a business decision is not a RFOA in order to establish a violation of the Act.").
99. See id. at 244 ("[W]ill the plaintiff have to prove the activity is not an
RFOA in order to state a claim?").
100. See id. ("[M]ust the defendant come forward with evidence to show the
factor considered was an RFOA ... ?"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482
(9th ed. 2009) (defining "affirmative defense").
101. See Tracey & Skoog, supra 4, at 261 ("[C]ourts may determine that
there is simply no need to even address burdens of proof or the shifting of production with respect to RFOAs in a disparate impact case.").
102. 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (2008).
103. Id. at 2403.
104. Id. at 2404.
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disparate impact plaintiffs under the ADEA.10 5 Aside from the
requirement that a plaintiff articulate a specific employment
practice, the Court stated that the "only thing at stake in this
case is the gap between production and persuasion."10 6 The
Court's condolences, however, were perhaps understated. By
reiterating "that the business necessity test should have no
place in ADEA disparate-impact cases," 0 7 but by failing to articulate an alternative test, the mere "gap" identified by the
Court is trivial in a significant way-the employer's burden of
persuasion will almost always be met by the production of any
factor other than age. In practice, this all but precludes the
possibility of disparate impact recovery under the ADEA.
II. THE STATUS QUO PROVIDES INADEQUATE
PROTECTION FOR OLDER WORKERS
Older workers are vulnerable because of the psychological
aspects of age discrimination, as well as an economic situation
that fosters a unique threat of exploitation. Part A explains
how an employer's reliance on a factor other than age will almost always be deemed sufficiently reasonable to preclude a
plaintiff's recovery. Part B discusses developments in psychology regarding implicit bias that emphasize the key role disparate impact can play in remedying age discrimination and highlights the fallacy of using mental culpability as a prerequisite
for its identification. Finally, Part C explains how the present
economic situation stresses the need for a fair and workable
theory of disparate impact under the ADEA, informing the costbenefit assessment necessary to evaluate an employer's RFOA
defense.
A. COURTS ARE LIKELY TO ESTABLISH TOO GREAT A THRESHOLD
FOR DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA
Although the precise standard for evaluating an employer's
RFOA defense remains unclear, the renewed rejection of "business necessity" standard in Meacham, 0 8 along with the Court's
reliance on Wards Cove in City of Jackson,109 makes it likely
105. Id. at 2406.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2404.
108. Id.
109. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) ("Wards Cove's pre1991 interpretation of Title VII's identical language remains applicable to the
ADEA.").
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that courts will subject an employer's RFOA defense to a trivial
level of scrutiny. The Court's analysis in Wards Cove merely
required that an employer provide a "business justification" for
its conduct in order to avoid liability. 11 0 Although Meacham
now properly requires employers to persuade courts of this legitimacy,11 1 it is difficult to imagine a scenario where an employer would be unable to meet this burden. The problem stems
from a number of areas of judicial confusion.
Courts analyzing the legitimacy of an RFOA are likely to
conflate the current standard with a similar degree of deference
afforded to corporations under the "business judgment rule." 112
The rule has been used in Title VII employment discrimination
contexts in the past. 113 In corporate law, the business judgment
rule is a subjective inquiry under which the challenged action
must meet a mere test of rationality. 114 It is a principle that establishes judicial reluctance to second-guess the business decisions of corporate officers. 115 Under the ADEA, Courts have similarly engaged in the practice of requiring only that an
employer's RFOA be subjectively reasonable and nondiscriminatory.116 Courts hearing ADEA claims have upheld "business
110. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) ("[A]t the
justification stage of such a disparate-impact case, the dispositive issue is
whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
111. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2402.
112. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 256 ("[Iln light of Smith, it is
likely that the esteem usually accorded to companies under the business
judgment rule will become even more of a factor in the employment discrimination cases.").
113. See, e.g., Deines v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164
F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is not the function of the jury to scrutinize .....

[w]hether the employer's decision was the correct one, or the fair one,

or the best one . . . ."); Blackman v. City of Dallas, No. 3:04-CV-2456-H, 2006
WL 1816390, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2006) ("[The Court declines to challenge
the business judgment of the City in its staffing decisions.").
114. See generally R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging
the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUs. LAw. 1337, 1337-39 (1993) (identifying
three positions on the business judgment rule: (1) the Delaware rule, (2) the
ALI rule, and (3) the Model Act rule).
115. See generally 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 39-90 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the elements of the rule).
116. See, e.g., Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 405 (6th Cir.
2008) (agreeing with the lower court that the defendant's conduct "might not
be the wisest method of running a hospital, but it is a reasonable factor other
than age in response to HHC's bulging employee costs").
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judgment" jury instructions.11 7 Case law regarding employers'
legitimate nondiscriminatory justifications is replete with references to protecting the sanctity of business judgments.118
Courts that preside over claims of age discrimination often cite
the maxim that they do not function as a "super-personnel department that reexamines the entity's business decisions."119
The deference afforded under the business judgment rule,
however, is greater than the deference that should be afforded
under the RFOA defense. In many cases, the business judgment rule is discussed with regard to a "presumption" in favor
of the employer.120 The business judgment rule forecloses corporate liability so long as directors and officers have operated
in "good faith."121 The doctrine essentially precludes a court
from evaluating the "'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or 'rationality"' of a business's decisions.1 22 Courts have also noted that the
business judgment rule allows employers to terminate employees for any nondiscriminatory reason, even if the reason
seems "objectively unwise."123 The scope of the business judg117. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat'1 Am. Univ., Civ. 06-5075, 2009 WL 2005306, at
*7 (D.S.D. July 8, 2009) (finding jury instructions in an ADEA case sufficient
where "[t]he jury received instructions on the elements that Jones had to
prove and on the business judgment rule").
118. See, e.g., Walker v. AT&T Techs., 995 F.2d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 1993)
("[A]n employer has the right to assign work to an employee, to change an employee's duties, to refuse to assign a particular job to an employee or even to
discharge for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all absent intentional
age discrimination .... .").
119. Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1994).
Compare id. (discussing the quoted material with regard to employment discrimination), with Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) ("To rule
otherwise would invite courts to become super-directors..... (emphasis added)).
120. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 1348 ("The 'presumption' of
the business judgment rule, however, may require a larger amount of proof to
satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard .... ).
121. Cole v. Nat'l Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931)
('There is a presumption that the judgment of the governing body of a corporation, whether at the time it consists of directors or majority stockholders, is
formed in good faith and inspired by a bona fides of purpose.").
122. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at
*14 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) ("To recognize in courts a residual power to
review the substance of business decisions for 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or
'rationality' where those decisions are made by truly disinterested directors in
good faith and with appropriate care is to make of courts super-directors.").
123. Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[P]ursuant to the 'business judgment' rule an employer is free to terminate
an employee for any nondiscriminatory reason, even if its business judgment
seems objectively unwise.").

2009]

DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA

483

ment rule is also inconsistent, granting judges wide latitude in
deciding when to apply it.124 These characteristics are ill-suited
to address the concerns presented by age discrimination, particularly a standard demanding an objective assessment of reasonableness, and one lacking the presumed existence of a reasonably informed actor.125 If the degree of deference afforded to
an employer's RFOA is the same as that afforded under the
business judgment rule, then it would appear that the only restraint upon an employer's conduct is its creativity in inventing
an alternative nondiscriminatory justification for its behavior.
Courts have also mistaken case law upholding employers'
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons at the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas test as persuasive in determining the business legitimacy of an RFOA. In a typical disparate treatment
claim, an employee first provides a prima facie case of discrimination. 126 In order to rebut this presumption, an employer responds by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its conduct.127 It is a rare case where an employer will fail
this step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting arrangement. 128 Consequently, some courts proceed directly to analyzing the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.129 In
the past, Courts evaluating an employer's RFOA defense have
124. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (stating that the contours of
the business judgment rule are for the courts to decide); Gerard C. Martin, Duties of Care Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1307, 1327 (1998) ("The boundaries of the business judgment rule, a doctrine intended to minimize judicial discretion to second-guess managerial decisions, had itself become subject to varying interpretations by judges."); cf.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888-90 (Del. 1985) (refusing to apply the
business judgment rule when directors are not reasonably informed), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
125. See Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Privatfized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1725 (2002) ('Due care' under the
business judgment rule is not the 'reasonable person' standard of negligence
commonly used in tort litigation; rather it requires that corporate decisionmakers be 'reasonably informed' before making a decision.").
126. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir.
2000) ("Our experience is that most cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the
plaintiff establish pretext."); see also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Discrimination,
Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 573 (2001) ("Proving that an employer's
LNRs [legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons] are untrue is not easy.").
129. See, e.g., Veliz v. City of Minneapolis, Civ. No. 07-2376, 2008 WL
2622966, at *5 (D. Minn. July 2, 2008) ("[The court] will jump directly to the
ultimate question of discrimination [and retaliation] vel non." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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applied these standards interchangeably.130 For some period of
time, the RFOA defense was thought to encapsulate the second
stage of the McDonnell Douglas test. 13 1
The burden required to prove the business legitimacy of an
RFOA, however, should be greater than the burden required to
rebut an employee's prima facie case of discrimination. First,
under the McDonnell Douglas test, the employer must only
meet a burden of production-the burden of persuasion remaining at all times with the plaintiff.132 The framework requires
only that an employer articulate a nondiscriminatory justification for its conduct, without considering its credibility.133 The
Meacham Court, however, places the burden of persuasion for
establishing the legitimacy of an RFOA upon the employer, requiring not only identification of a factor other than age, but also a yet-to-be-articulated degree of convincing reasonableness. 13 4 Additionally, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
an employee has the opportunity at the third stage to refute the
employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by proving pretext.135 In evaluating the RFOA defense, the Court has not articulated how an employee might be given a similar opportunity
to refute the business legitimacy of an employer's reliance on a
factor other than age.
There is simply a paucity of case law discussing the precise
standard by which a court should evaluate an employer's RFOA
130. See, e.g., Bender v. Hecht's Dep't Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir.
2006) ("According to Hecht's, it implemented the workforce reduction with the
goal of reducing expenses and retaining the strongest employees.. . . These
certainly qualify as legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the company's
actions."); Reese v. Potter, No. Civ. A. 03-1987, 2005 WL 3274052, at *5
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2005) ("Because the ADEA does not prohibit adverse employment action based on reasonable factors other than age or for good cause,
the USPS has met its initial burden of providing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying Ms. Reese the promotion." (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
131. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ("In [the
RFOA defense], to be sure, Congress made plain that the age statute was not
meant to prohibit employment decisions based on factors that sometimes accompany advancing age, such as declining health or diminished vigor and
competence. But as McDonnell Douglas is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience, it affords ample scope for
the operation of this provision." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
132. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
133. See id. at 257.
134. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (2008).
135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
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defense. 136 Courts, therefore, currently possess excessive discretion in determining what types of factors other than age will
be sufficiently reasonable. 13 7 It should come as no surprise that
a variety of factors that might meet the test of business legitimacy are also functional proxies for what would otherwise be
age discrimination. 138 An employee's proximity to retirement, 139
salary level,140 and the number of years employed141 are almost
always directly related to an individual's age and have been
upheld as RFOAs. Subjective evaluations of an employee's
physical capability, willingness to change, and ability to interact with others might also illicit bias on behalf of evaluators. 1 4 2 Current case law, however, does not indicate how closely related to age a factor can be while still functioning as a
valid RFOA.143
B. THE CURRENT STANDARD INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE
NATURE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION

The excessive deference likely to be afforded under a standard of business legitimacy is further complicated by the nature of age discrimination itself. Employers are not only unlikely to admit to relying on age as a factor in their employment

136. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 258 ("The Supreme Court has yet
to articulate the context in which it will evaluate RFOAs and the business rationale supporting them.").
137. See id. at 258-63 (discussing the various potential interpretations
courts may adopt in evaluating employers' RFOA defenses).
138. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2403 ("Reasonableness is ... not necessarily
correlated with [age] in any particular way: a reasonable factor may lean more
heavily on older workers, as against younger ones, and an unreasonable factor
might do just the opposite.").
139. See, e.g., N.Y. 10-13 Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 1425,
2000 WL 1376101, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2000) (finding that connecting
benefits provided to retirement status based on years of service was a valid
RFOA).
140. See, e.g., Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 404-05 (6th
Cir. 2008) (finding that termination of employees based on salary was a valid
RFOA).
141. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242-43 (2005) (finding that giving larger salary increases to lower echelon employees was a valid
RFOA).
142. Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001) ("While
subjective criteria . . . may serve legitimate functions, they also provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination because the criteria itself may be pretext
for age discrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2403.
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decisions,144 they may not even be aware of its effect.145 The
theory of disparate impact, however, proceeds by substituting a
showing of statistical disparity for an inquiry into intent.146 To
this extent, disparate impact is distinct from disparate treatment in establishing liability for discrimination caused by policies and procedures, as opposed to particular individuals.147
Several developments in social psychology support these conclusions, and courts should allow them to serve an evidentiary
role for determining liability for discrimination under the
ADEA.
Studies show that individuals are surprisingly adept at offering nondiscriminatory justifications for their discriminatory
behavior.148 One such study charged individuals with selecting
between two candidates--one female and one male-for the job
of a construction manager.149 In one trial, the male candidate
had more experience, but less education; in a separate trial, the
male candidate had more education, but less experience.150 Irrespective of the criteria employed, most individuals chose the
male candidate over the female candidate, and justified their
decision using whichever criterion was superior for their chosen
candidate.1 5 ' Although the study observed these results with
144. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner,
J.) ("Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it. . . .").
145. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 2, at 1036-37 ("[W]hen faced with
making a choice between members of different social groups, people whose
preferences are implicitly shaped by group membership spontaneously search
for independent decision criteria consistent with their preference, and use
those criteria to justify their choices to themselves and others.").
146. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977).
147. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved
with Good Intentions?:Stuck on State of Mind in AntidiscriminationLaw, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141, 1179-82 (2007) (offering a critique of a unitary
theory of employment discrimination liability and explaining the distinction
between disparate impact and disparate treatment).
148. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgment, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory
Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263
(2007) ("[P]eople can offer compelling explanations for their behavior even
when unaware of the factors-such as race-that are actually influential.").
149. Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 817, 820 (2004).
150. Id.
151. See id. ("(Mlale participants who select men for management positions
justify that selection by inflating the importance of whichever qualification
favors a male candidate.").
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respect to gender, from a psychological perspective, age, along
with race, are considered equally salient characteristics and
thus similar results could be expected. 152 Researchers posit that
social pressure and awareness of laws against discrimination
compel individuals to justify their decisions using legitimate
criterion, irrespective of the role of illegitimate factors in their
decision. 153 Researchers also note that this phenomenon occurs
both consciously and unconsciously.154 Thus, for disparate impact claims under the present standard of business legitimacy,
an employer will almost always be able to produce a sufficient
RFOA.
To the extent that many of these processes occur without
the conscious awareness of the test subject, disparate impact is
an important remedy for victims of age discrimination. Studies
consistently show that people harbor negative attitudes towards aging and elderly people.1 55 These stereotypes suggest
that older people are "cognitively slower, sexless, unable or unwilling to change, less intelligent, weaker, physically slower,
stubborn, negative, conservative and dependant." 5 6 Acceptance
of these attitudes is often institutionalized, taking the form of
company policies and operating procedures, making their presence less conspicuous.15 7 Studies also show that these attitudes
operate at an implicit level. Data collected from respondents on
152. See Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation, in 1 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 6-9 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S.
Wyer, Jr. eds., 1988).
153. See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteriaon Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 36, 39-44 (2006) ("Unfortunately for litigants seeking to prove
bias in these decisions, people are quite good at masking their biased behavior
by couching it in more acceptable terms, both to avoid the appearance of impropriety and as part of a more general effort to view themselves and their
choices positively.").
154. See Norton et al., supra note 149, at 828 ("It is quite clear that the
phenomenon can be entirely conscious and strategic .

. .

. It is also possible

that the employer may truly wish to avoid using social category information
... yet unknowingly allow these stereotypes to influence his review of resumes.").
155. See Mary E. Kite & Lisa Smith Wagner, Attitudes Toward Older
Adults, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS
129, 129-61 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002).
156. Todd D. Nelson, The Young Science of Prejudice Against Older Adults:
EstablishedAnswers and Open Questions About Ageism, in BEYOND COMMON
SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 45, 45-46 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
157. Cf. id. at 49 (noting the institutionalization of ageism and describing
its subtle manifestations).
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the Implicit Association Test (IAT), showed that irrespective of
age, a majority of individuals hold "negative implicit attitudes
towards older people."15 8 A number of other studies support the
conclusion that these negative attitudes operate without conscious awareness to influence people's actual behavior. 5 9 Unfortunately for victims of age discrimination, the lack of explicit
evidence will most often preclude the possibility of a successful
claim for disparate treatment under the ADEA.160 The remedy
of disparate impact, however, proceeds without explicit evidence of discrimination on behalf of the decision maker.' 6 ' For
this reason, broad application of disparate impact theory is advocated by many social scientists involved in IAT research-it
is important that their findings be available for consideration
by the trier of fact. 162
The implicit stereotypes these studies measure are made
salient when individuals are generally queried about their attitudes toward "older people."163 However, when individuals are
asked about one older person in particular, the response is less
likely to reflect a negative stereotype.164 Age discrimination in
particular is thus less likely to operate in a way that produces
the type of evidence necessary to bring a disparate treatment
claim. Since employers are less likely to harbor negative stereotypes about a specific employee, the direct evidence required for
a disparate treatment claim will often be unavailable, creating
a particular problem given the restrictive interpretations the
Supreme Court has adopted for mixed-motive instructions and
the general use of circumstantial evidence in ADEA disparate
158. See id. at 50.
159. See id. at 50-51.
160. The Court recently held that the ADEA does not authorize mixedmotive disparate treatment claims. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). Accordingly, a disparate treatment claim can only succeed where the plaintiff is able to prove "that age was the 'but-for' cause of the
challenged employer decision." Id. at 2351. As a result, disparate treatment
claims under the ADEA will fail when the employer's decision was motivated
by both impermissible and permissible factors. A plaintiff lacking direct evidence, of course, would face extreme difficulty proving that age was the sole
consideration in the employer's decision.
161. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 147, at 1181 ("The focus ... is on the
neutral policy or procedure, its effects, and its justifications, not on the decision maker, his or her decisions, and the decision-making process.").
162. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 2, at 1004.
163. See Walter H. Crockett & Mary Lee Hummert, Perceptions of Aging
and the Elderly, in 7 ANNUAL REvIEW OF GERONTOLOGY AND GERIATRICS 217,
220 (K. Warner Schaie & Carl Eisdorfer eds., 1987).
164. See id. at 218.
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treatment claims.165 As a large percentage of negative stereotypes about older people will be the result of macro generalizations about the class, it should come as no surprise that age
discrimination will often occur in situations like large-scale involuntary reductions-in-force,1 66 where the remedy best suited
to address such claims is disparate impact.
C. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS MAKES ALLEVIATING AGE
DISCRIMINATION PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT

The current economic climate places older employees in a
uniquely precarious situation. Economic hardship often falls
disproportionately upon these individuals. 16 7 From an employment perspective, older workers often appear to be the most
expensive employees, carrying with them large costs in salary,
healthcare, accommodations, and pensions.16 8 The number of
individuals subject to this risk is growing faster than ever-a
baby boomer turns sixty every seven seconds.1 69 Since the retirement savings of most of these Americans have suffered major setbacks, many of these older workers must now entertain
the prospect of working well beyond their projected age of retirement.170 It should come as no surprise then, that during periods of economic downturn claims of age discrimination rise
sharply.171 The economic concerns giving rise to extreme cost165. Since mixed-motive instructions are not authorized for disparate
treatment claims under the ADEA, see Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to rely solely on circumstantial evidence
to prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's decision.
166. See Sperino, supra note 97, at 371 ("Of the 176 total cases, 74 (approximately 42%) of the cases involved employees challenging termination and rehiring decisions relating to reductions-in-force.").
167. MARIA HEIDKAMP & CARL E. VAN HORN, SLOAN CTR. ON AGING &
WORK AT BOSTON COLL., ISSUE BRIEF 16: OLDER AND OUT OF WORK: TRENDS
IN OLDER WORKER DISPLACEMENT 2 (2008), http://agingandwork.bc.edu/

documents/IB16_OlderOutofWork.pdf (discussing the effects of the recent economic crisis on older workers).
168. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229,
254-58 (1990) ("[Slince higher compensation costs are often a function of accumulated seniority, the cost comparison predictably, even if unintentionally,
operates against older workers.").
169. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 8.
170. SLOAN CTR. ON AGING & WORK AT BOSTON COLL., FACT SHEET 25:
TIMING OF RETIREMENT AND THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS 1 (2009), http://

agingandwork.bc.eduldocuments/FS25_TimingofRetirement_2009-08-18.pdf
(discussing the increasing number of older workers postponing retirement).
171. See, e.g., Kathy Chen, Age-Discrimination Complaints Rose 8.7% in
2001 Amid Overall Increase in Claims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at B13
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cutting measures at the expense of older employees support the
wider availability of disparate impact under the ADEA, and a
solution that allows the trier of fact to make a cost-benefit assessment based on the evidence before it.
During periods of economic downturn, involuntary reductions-in-force based on age discrimination take unfair and ultimately inefficient advantage of the implicit long-term contracts created between employees and their employers. 172
Lazear's model of labor relations suggests that employees enter
into implicit arrangements with their employers for wages below their productivity at the onset of their career, with the expectation that they will be compensated above their productivity later in their career.173 The model is beneficial to employers
because it reduces risks associated with hiring new employees
and encourages worker effort.174 The model is also beneficial to
employees because it results in promotions and higher earnings
later in their careers. 175 An employer who terminates its employee before the present value of the employee's total productivity and earned wages reach equilibrium, however, obtains an
unfair windfall given the total life cycle of the employee. 176
Economic decline creates a dangerous incentive for this type of
behavior through involuntary reductions-in-force based on
proxies for age.177 The theory of disparate impact is best-suited
to address these claims.178 The Court's present approach to evaluating employers' RFOA, however, is unlikely to classify such
("[T]he number of age-bias claims against private-sector employers jumped
8.7% to 17,405 in the 2001 fiscal year that ended Sept. 30 .... ).
172. See generally Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. EcON. 1261-81 (1979) (describing the inefficient practice of
forcing older workers into retirement rather than decreasing their wages proportionate to relative productivity).
173. See David Neumark, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act and
the Challenge of PopulationAging, 31 RESEARCH ON AGING 41, 57 (2009).
174.
175.
176.

See id.
See id.
See id.

177. See Kohrman & Hayes, supra note 17, at 160-61 ("A second explanation as to why older workers experience such high job displacement rates
draws on the insights of microeconomic theory and posits that older workers
are particularly vulnerable in RIF [reduction-in-force] settings, not because of
age bias, but because of 'wage bias."').
178. See Kaminshine, supra note 168, at 318-20 ("[T]he risk is that in a
large-scale layoff, where abilities within the targeted pool may vary, a cost
conscious employer may sacrifice the accuracy of individual performance reviews and rely on age-related salary comparisons as a more crude but less
costly selection device.").
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conduct as creating liability.179 The cost, unfortunately, is
borne by more than just the individual employee.
Reductions-in-force based on age discrimination present a
threat not only to the financial well-being of older workers, but
the health of the economy as a whole. Age discrimination inefficiently removes valuable employees from the workforce. 8 0 For
some time scholars have noted concerns over the "graying" of
the American workforce and the vacuum of worker experience
expected to follow suit.181 While reliance upon nonperformance-based factors is inconsistent with market efficiency, it is nevertheless clear that the market sometimes fails to
eliminate such inefficient discriminatory behavior.182 Even if
short-term incentives exist to engage in statistical discrimination based on age, 183 such discrimination is contrary to the
types of long-term implicit contracts formed under Lazear's
model of labor relations1 84 and is the precise type of discrimination criticized in the Wirtz Report. 8 5 In any event, although enforcement of the ADEA places restraints upon the business decisions of employers, it is not necessarily the case that such

179. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128. S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05
(2008).
180. See WIRTZ, supra note 24, at 18 (describing the harms of unemployment in the older workforce on the national economy).
181. See DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 5 ("[T]he aging of the population has many implications for the U.S. labor market, including possible labor
and skill shortages. Employers will be challenged to find and train replacements as some of their most experienced workers retire."); BEVERLY GOLDBERG, AGE WORKS: WHAT CORPORATE AMERICA MUST Do To SURVIVE THE
GRAYING OF THE WORKFORCE 21-24 (2000) (noting the trend toward a "graying" workforce and the potential shortage of workers with modern skills); Luo,
supra note 15 (describing companies' reluctance to fire older workers and lose
their substantial experience).
182. See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1411, 1423-31 (1986) ("Some firms will soon realize that they will be unable to
compete and therefore will exit more rapidly, whereas others will try to ward
off the inevitable and succumb more slowly to the ineluctable market forces.");
Kaminshine, supra note 168, at 239 ("[D]iscrimination, at least in the short
term, is not always economically irrational. According to economists, an employer might find forbidden criteria attractive, even if only crudely predictive
of productivity needs, because they are relatively convenient and cheap to administer.").
183. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 322-25 (1995) (describing the incentives of statistical discrimination based upon age to "weed out"
inefficient workers).
184. See Neumark, supra note 173, at 57 (explaining Lazear's laborrelations model).
185. See WIRTZ, supra note 24, at 18-19.
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restraints will hinder economic potential.186 A revised standard
allowing for a cost-benefit assessment of reasonableness seems
likely to alleviate such concerns.
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THE RFOA
DEFENSE
In the four years since City of Jackson, there has yet to be
a successful disparate impact claim under the ADEA. Courts
have routinely dismissed claims at the summary judgment
stage and earlier, for either failing to articulate a specific employment practice,187 or for an inability to overcome an employer's RFOA defense.188 The practical impossibility for plaintiffs
to succeed upon these claims, despite the Court's recognition of
the disparate impact theory's availability under the ADEA,
should raise concerns about the appropriate standards by
which these claims are judged. With Meacham's resolution of a
central issue regarding the allocation of burdens, full attention
can be devoted towards defining a standard for evaluating the
RFOA defense.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence, however, provides
stark guidance for assessing the "reasonableness" element of
the defense.189 While the Court's decision in Meacham makes it
clear that application of the "business necessity" standard
"'[did] not survive' City of Jackson," it offers no insight as to
when an employer's RFOA might be insufficient to preclude
liability.190 Lower courts are left with no alternative other than
to analyze an employer's RFOA with levels of scrutiny analog186. See Donohue, supra note 182, at 1431 ("[A]ntidiscrimination legislation may be thought of as a tool to perfect the market response to employer
discrimination.").
187. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (finding
that plaintiff's mere identification of disparity in pay plan was not a sufficiently specific employment practice).
188. See, e.g., Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 405 (6th Cir.
2008).
189. See Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing?
That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 839 (1997) (identifying the RFOA defense as "virtually unlitigated under the ADEA").
190. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 n.9
(2008); see also Sarah Benjes, Comment, Smith v. City of Jackson: A Pretext of
Victory for Employees, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 231, 249 (2005) ("[The Court did
not propose any limitations to this RFOA test, nor did it offer any factors to
judge reasonableness or any examples of what would constitute an unreasonable non-age factor.").
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ous to the type of business legitimacy standard articulated in
Wards Cove. 191 In such scenarios, courts have afforded employers under the RFOA defense the degree of deference used under
the business judgment rule,192 and accepted as persuasive employers' survival of the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.1 93 Both situations render the theory of disparate
impact practically unavailable for plaintiffs under the ADEA,
but this could not have been the intention of the Supreme
Court in recognizing the availability of disparate impact for victims of age discrimination.
A. MOTIVE IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: REFOCUSING ON THE
FUNDAMENTALS

The consequence of using mere business legitimacy to evaluate an employer's RFOA is that only one type of conduct will
establish liability under the ADEA: explicit reliance upon age
as a discriminating factor. Under a business legitimacy standard, courts tend to find practically any proxy for age to be a
valid RFOA, thus shielding an employer from liability.194 The
nature of age discrimination operates in a way that makes the
availability of this evidence highly unlikely; when it is, a plaintiff is able to bring a claim for disparate treatment instead.195
Individuals satisfied with this outcome are comfortable with
the underlying assumption that smoking-gun evidence of intent
to discriminate is an essential aspect of a successful employ-

191. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 263 (concluding that courts are
likely to use low thresholds when evaluating an employer's RFOA).
192. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Cabot, No. 4:08-CV-00139, 2008 WL
4816617, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008) ("Although Walker appears to contend
that his termination was not financially necessary as of June 2007, even assuming that this is true, it was reasonable to terminate Walker to eliminate
redundant positions and reduce expenses.").
193. See, e.g., Aliotta v. Bair, 576 F. Supp. 2d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2008)
("[The plaintiffs' evidence does not rebut the defendant's proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the 2005 downsizing.").
194. See, e.g., Schlitz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1411-12 (8th
Cir. 1997) ("[T]he factors used by Andres in making his hiring decisions, such
as salary and grade level . . . are correlative with age, but are not prohibited
considerations.").
195. See Tracey & Skoog, supra note 4, at 260 ("In a disparate impact case,
the specter of intentional discrimination does not raise its head, and the plaintiff has no obligation to prove it. Certainly had a plaintiff been able to do so, he
or she would or should have also filed a claim under a disparate treatment
theory.").
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ment age discrimination claim. 196 In order to formulate an effective standard by which to judge the RFOA defense, this assumption must be discredited.
A basic, although important, distinction to keep in mind is
the fundamental difference between criminal and tort liability.
Antidiscrimination law is best served by emphasizing its obvious association with the latter. 197 The essence of criminal lia- .
bility lies in a determination of a defendant's mens rea; a characteristic making it generally incompatible with the use of
economic analysis to seek policy-based outcomes. 9 8 For example, criminal law makes the appropriate moral distinction between one who causes the death of another intentionally, and
one who causes it negligently.199 With the exception of certain
malum prohibitum crimes, 200 a defendant will be subject to punishment only after finding a requisite level of mental culpability. 20 1 Investigation into motive and intent is justified when the
philosophies underlying criminal law-deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution-are taken into consideration. 202 Yet, scholars have experienced difficulties justifying the
element of mens rea in economic terms that explain, and thus
help control, human behavior. 203
196. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 147, at 1145 ("Litigants, courts, and
theorists have all contributed to the enmeshment of the disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories, and each of these stakeholders has remained
stuck on state of mind evidence in a way that has helped erode the disparate
impact theory.").
197. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What
Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 259, 265-66 (2008) (arguing that tort liability does not require an inquiry
into normative questions of fault, and that future developments in antidiscrimination law should instead focus upon policy objectives).
198. See Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CAL. L. REV.
895, 918 (2000) ("If it is indeed correct that the criminal category is demarcated by the notion of mens rea, then the distinctive nature of criminal, as opposed to civil, liability cannot be accounted for in economic terms.").
199. See Black, supra note 197, at 267 ('This is not to suggest that people
who accidentally kill and those who intentionally kill are morally indistinguishable from one another; a difference certainly exists and criminal law
takes that difference into account.").
200. Malum prohibitum is defined as "[a]n act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (9th ed. 2009).
201. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing the mens rea requirement in criminal law).
202. See generally id. § 1.5 (discussing criminal theories of punishment).
203. See Finkelstein, supra note 198, at 918 ("fE]conomic analysis fails to
offer an adequate descriptive account of the criminal . . . because the exemp-

2009]

DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA

495

In comparison, tort liability requires no equivalent assessment of mental culpability. 204 Although some torts are actionable only upon a showing of intent or recklessness, this examination of fault is, at most, a secondary consideration. 2 05 The
primary inquiry of tort law surrounds the prevention of undesirable policy outcomes. 206 For example, determination of a defendant's motive or intent is irrelevant to a plaintiff's claim for
loss of consortium. 207 Likewise, application of Judge Hand's
familiar B < PL formula does not concern itself with a faultbased inquiry. 208 The Hand formula is an objective cost-benefit
assessment, establishing negligence when the cost of exercising
care (B) is less than the magnitude of injury (L) discounted by
its probability (P).209 To this extent, most tort law proceeds by
identifying a desirable policy outcome and then formulating the
legal standards necessary to achieve it.210 Standards in antidiscrimination law should follow this fundamental premise.
Articulating antidiscrimination law as a species of tort law
is not a novel assertion. 211 Nor does this fact alone exclude it
from attaching elements of fault to certain causes of actionmany torts contain such requirements. 2 12 The comparison,
tion of that category from cost-benefit analysis is based on the fact that the
harm is inflicted with awareness and control.").
204. See Black, supra note 197, at 267 ('Tort law does not delude itself, as
does antidiscrimination law, with the notion that it is punishing 'wrongdoers'
or morally unacceptable 'faulty' conduct.").
205. See id. at 268 ("[A] tort-based approach demands an identification of
the actual results of the intent standard, or any other standard, and whether
those results further our goals.").
206. See id. ("[Tiort principles demonstrate that, without attention to the
goals or intended results of equal protection and antidiscrimination, nothing
justifies the intent standard or renders it more appropriate than other standards.").
207. See id. at 267 (discussing why a tort system need not consider fault if
"its only purpose is to compensate family members for their loss of support").
208. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (concluding that determining duty is a function of three variables).
209. Id.
210. See Black, supra note 197, at 293 ("As society changed, so did its
needs, dangers, cultural customs, and goals. Tort law simply followed these
changes, attempting to create standards that reflected the varying concepts of
social value and utility.").
211. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 970-71 (1993) (offering an alternative to the popular notion that moral condemnation is key to imposing liability for discrimination).
212. See Black, supra note 197, at 278 ("The justification for a higher mens
rea in these cases is not based on a concept of fault, but rather is primarily a
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however, is simply intended to show that there is nothing about
a framework for antidiscrimination law that inherently mandates a showing of motive or intent. 213 Furthermore, the broader principle of tort law, involving a focus upon policy-driven
outcomes as opposed to moral condemnation, is helpful when
considering an alternative standard for evaluating the RFOA
defense.
B. EVALUATING REASONABLENESS: A FAMILIAR INQUIRY

If the fundamental premise of tort law is achieving desirable policy outcomes, then statutorily speaking, the RFOA defense is an excellent candidate to be interpreted in such a manner. Courts commonly approach "reasonableness" with a
balancing assessment. 214 Accordingly, evaluating an employer's
RFOA should be conducted within the rubric of the familiar
Hand formula: B < PL. 2 1 5 If the goal of the ADEA is to reduce
the harm caused by age discrimination, the costs of that harm
can be represented by the gravity of the adverse employment
action (L) discounted by the likelihood that age played a role as
an illegitimate criterion (P). Employers have thus relied upon
an unreasonable factor when the total cost of injury (P x L) is
greater than the cost that would have been imposed upon an
employer forgoing the decision relying upon that factor (B).
Take, for example, an employer who decides to eliminate
thirty employees during an internal reorganization by evaluating employee performance across a range of subjective factors.
As a result of this reduction-in-force, twenty-five of the thirty
employees terminated are over the age of forty and thus within
the class protected under the ADEA. If these twenty-five employees filed a claim under the ADEA for disparate impact, the
employer's reliance on a factor other than age would be a successful defense if the employer could persuade the trier of fact
that the magnitude of the injury (P), multiplied by the probability of discrimination (L), was less than the cost that the employer would have borne if it had not engaged in the restructuring (B).
factor of cost-utility balancing, which must account for the inherent social utility and value of the challenged activity.").
213. See id. at 279 ("The breadth and variance within the above spectrum
of torts demonstrates that no inherent, consistent, or agreed upon form of fault
exists to necessarily justify forcing one individual to compensate another.").
214. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (balancing interests
to determine "reasonableness" of searches and seizures).
215. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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If the employer in this example persuaded the trier of fact
that by terminating the twenty-five plaintiffs and reassigning
their job duties elsewhere it obtained a cost-savings of $500,000
per year, this amount would represent (B). Providing such evidence should be within an employer's capability-employers
are already on notice concerning the importance of documenting and evaluating costs associated with relying upon different
factors before engaging in internal restructuring as a method of
cutting costs. 2 16 In assessing the employer's theoretical burden,
the trier of fact should consider the nature of the costs urged by
the employer and reject inclusion of supracompetitive profits
derived from market failure. 217 The only profit margins that
should be cognizable within the formula are those that allow
the employer to cover its own costs and not those that allow the
employer to raise prices above its costs in exploitation of a noncompetitive market. 2 18
Calculating the likelihood that a given factor will be influenced by age discrimination (P) is also within the capability of
the trier of fact. 219 Both employees and employers are capable
of introducing expert testimony providing the trier of fact with
tools to assess the likelihood of age discrimination. For example, the employer in this example might provide evidence that
precautionary measures taken during its internal restructuring
reduced the likelihood of age being used as an illegitimate criterion. 220 The plaintiff might respond with evidence showing
216. See O'Kelly E. McWilliams III & Nimesh M. Patel, Diversity Management in an Economic Downturn: Diversity & Risk Mitigation in Corporate Restructuring,Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 59, 60 ('The need for identifying and documenting the business needs driving the restructuring efforts and
the factors to be used in making the decisions, as well as the reasonableness of
the factors, was recently emphasized by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Meacham].").
217. See Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct
Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 718 (2007) ("Distinguishing pro-competitive increments to profits
(those that let firms cover their costs) from anti-competitive increments to
profits (those that let firms raise the price above their costs) challenges this
unconditional deference to the normative reasonableness of profitability.").
218. See id. at 690 ("An employer who merely matches the market salaries
of low-wage employees may merely be reflecting these employees' relative lack
of market power.").
219. See, e.g., Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 428 (7th Cir.
2000) (permitting statistical expert testimony to proceed in an ADEA disparate impact claim).
220. See McWilliams & Patel, supra note 216, at 60 ("[M]anagement should
highlight the objective reasons for grouping employees subject to restructuring
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that the evaluator's subjective determinations about an employee's physical capabilities, motivation, and willingness to
adapt to new technologies had a high probability of being influenced by implicit age-related assumptions. 221 Inevitably, the
trier of fact will face a difficult assessment concerning the likelihood of age having played a role in the decision-making
process-one that might not be easily quantifiable. 222 Such an
assessment, however, is not unusual or excessively burdensome. Since the beginning of negligence as a standard for liability, courts have been asked to determine the probability of injury in formulating the duty of care. 223 Courts engage in similar
balancing inquiries in other types of employment cases. 224 They
face an even more challenging task when asked to make such
assessments about the low-probability high-cost catastrophic
injuries involved toxic tort cases. 225
For the purpose of this simplified example, say that the
trier of fact determines a 75% probability exists for the presence of age bias as an illegitimate criterion. This probability (P)
would be multiplied by the magnitude of the injury (L), as determined by the total cost to the class of disparate impact
plaintiffs if discrimination were to found to have occurred. Asefforts, such as by business unit, responsibilities/job duties, geographic location, etc.").
221. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001)
("While subjective criteria . . . 'may serve legitimate functions, they also provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination' because the criteria itself may
be pretext for age discrimination." (quoting Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d
324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993))); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1690, 1711 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 1977), aff'd, 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980)
("Management's concern about the increasing age of its staff, reduced hiring,
new technical developments, and emphasis on recruiting and advancing young
Ph'd's [sic] might not violate ADEA in themselves, but these policies and attitudes could easily be reflected in subjective performance ratings.").
222. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir.
1987) (admitting that Hand's formula is a conceptual tool that tends to defy
reliable quantification).
223. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182 (5th ed.
1998) ("[T]he method [Hand's formula] capsulizes has been used to determine
negligence ever since negligence was first adopted as the standard to govern
accident cases.').
224. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967) ("In
some situations, 'legitimate and substantial business justifications' for refusing to reinstate employees who engaged in an economic strike, have been recognized.").
225. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 256-72 (1987) (analyzing negligence in the context
of catastrophic injuries).
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sessing this variable shifts the focus away from the present approach, which considers the reasonability of the employer's
burden in a vacuum, to one that includes the cost borne by the
plaintiff as well. Evaluating the magnitude of injury should also not be problematic. The gravity of discriminatory adverse
employment actions should inevitably be considered by the trier of fact when determining the award of damages. Similarly,
the possibility of loss and the expected cost of preventing the
loss are also part of the common practice for formulating the
duty of care in negligence cases. 226 Assessments of the injuries
borne by individuals and society as a result of age discrimination were made as early as the Wirtz Report. 227 The magnitude
of injury might be based upon front pay, back pay, payment of
wages owed, and injunctive relief, as well as injuries caused by
emotional distress, and pain and suffering. Here, assume that
the total amount of front and back pay owed to the class was
calculated at $1,000,000. In this example, the employer's defense would fail since the $500,000 cost savings (B) would be
less than the $750,000 total injury as determined by the
$1,000,000 cost to the plaintiffs (L) discounted by the 75%
probability of discrimination (P).
Despite the difficulties that often exist in manipulating
courtroom evidence into an algebraic formula, and the unlikelihood of a real world situation as easily quantifiable as the
above example, evaluating these variables is a workable standard within the context of the RFOA defense. 228 Even Judge
Hand recognized that the variables in his equation would not
always be subject to simple quantitative assessment. 229 Moreover, judges and juries are required to engage in this type of
cost-benefit analysis on a regular basis. Thus, using the formu-

226. See POSNER, supra note 223, at 182.
227. See WIRTZ, supra note 24, at 18-19 (discussing economic injury incurred by individuals terminated as a result of age discrimination).
228. This is especially true because Judge Hand's formula has been applied
in other areas of legal analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (applying the Hand formula to a constitutional determination of free speech); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (suggesting that a court should apply the Hand formula to determine when to regulate speech).
229. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand,
J.) ("All these are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and
the second two are generally not so, even theoretically."), rev'd on other
grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
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la to evaluate an employer's RFOA seems unlikely to pose any
new problems. 230
Most of the information necessary to assess the variables of
the B < PL formula can be provided by the litigants through the
introduction of expert testimony. This is particularly true for
determining the likelihood that age played a role as an illegitimate criterion, (P). A number of critics, however, disapprove of
expert testimony premised upon empirical research claiming to
have established the effects of implicit bias in workplace settings. 23 1 Indeed, courts are reluctant to admit the type of expert
testimony that sheds light on these inquiries. 232 This reluctance
is not specific to claims of age discrimination. 233 The behavioral-realist movement has responded to the refusal of courts to
admit the testimony of peer-reviewed social scientists for the
purpose of determining the existence and impact of implicit bias in employment settings, and they offer compelling arguments in support of their position. 234 There are, however, documented instances where such evidence has been admitted in
conjunction with evidence of statistical disparity to establish
liability under disparate impact, 235 and it is only a matter of
230. Courts have engaged in balancing similar to the Hand formula in
areas as diverse as administrative law and the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (weighing the private interest,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest, and the government's interest); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (using the
Hand formula to determine whether to regulate the speech at issue).
231. See, e.g., David M. O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social
Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8, 11 (1980) (arguing that judges
"should abandon the practice of justifying their decisions on the basis of empirical propositions").
232. See, e.g., Kotla v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898, 903
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting expert testimony from a social psychologist in
an employment discrimination case on the grounds that "the subject of inquiry
is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach
a conclusion as intelligently as the witness," (quoting People v. McAlpin, 812
P.2d 563, 568-69 (Cal. 1991))).
233. See O'Brien, supra note 231, at 11 (criticizing the use of empirical research in general).
234. See generally Krieger & Fiske, supranote 2, at 1006 ("Behavioral realism, understood as a prescriptive theory of judicial decision making, addresses
this problem by proposing that, before judges use lay or 'common sense' psychological theories in their legal analysis, they should take reasonable steps to
ensure that those theories are valid.").
235. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hercules, Inc., No. 93-4175, 1995 WL 66828, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1995) (allowing a plaintiff, on a Daubert motion in an age
discrimination claim, to use statistical expert analysis to prove that the employer's subjective employment practice had a disparate impact).
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time before such use becomes more prevalent. 236 Although
courts have been behind the curve in accepting it,237 there appears to be little reason for failing to do so. 238 If judges are unwilling to admit relevant expert testimony under current evidentiary standards, one solution might be for Congress to
respond by amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to make
the use of such evidence in disparate impact claims more accessible to litigants. 239 With these reluctances cast aside, a
range of probative information becomes cognizable within
Judge Hand's B < PL formula, transforming it into a viable tool
for evaluating the RFOA defense.
Some might criticize the Hand formula and the process of
quantifying its variables as too complicated for the trier of fact.
Some might even argue that since any degree of precise quantification is impossible, the Hand formula merely defines an admittedly arbitrary assessment. These objections not only understate the competence of the trier of fact, but they also
overstate the complexity of the application of Hand's formula in
practice. Even if evidence is not easily quantifiable, or perhaps
even arbitrary, the primary benefit of Hand's formula lies in its
role as an instructive normative standard. 240 Judge Hand's
formula provides the trier of fact with a framework for evaluating the employer's RFOA defense from an objective standpoint,
instructing it to balance the parties' interests rather than unquestioningly accept an employer's subjective justification for
its discriminatory practice. In the simplest of terms, the revised
standard replaces mere deference with a more equitable balancing approach.
236. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 2, at 1062 (discussing the inevitability
of a day when a court of last resort will be forced to address the consequences
of implicit stereotypes and the related research).
237. See id. at 1025-26 (discussing the "lag time" between psychological
and jurisprudential theories and identifying several examples).
238. See id. at 1022-24 (finding there is no reason for courts not to allow
scientific psychological studies when the alternative is for judges to rely on
their personal intuitions regarding human behavior).
239. There is historical precedent for such legislative initiatives. Congress
responded to the Supreme Court's ruling in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991), which held that expert-witness fees
could not be recovered by litigants, by giving courts discretion to "include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006). The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 also amended Title VII to include expert fees. Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2006)).
240. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[Hand's] formula has greater analytic than operational significance.").
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As a result, reliance on age-related factors driven by exploitive cost-savings would no longer be subject to trivial scrutiny. Considering the degree of injury to the employee prevents
employers from unfairly profiting off the inferior bargaining
position of many older workers. 24 1 The approach would also encourage employers to recognize the sort of long-term implicit
contracts suggested by Lazear's model of labor relations. 242
Since the degree of undercompensation incurred by an employee early in the employee's career is factored into the employee's future salary, 243 that value is represented in the cost of
injury to the employee (L) by the amount of front pay she would
have received had she not been terminated. After being discounted by the probability that age was used as an illegitimate
criterion (P), the cost of violating these implied agreements
would be transferred to the employer if the burden (B) in forgoing the adverse employment action would have been less
than that which was imposed upon the employee.
Applying Judge Hand's formula for determining the validity of an employer's reliance on an RFOA would offer a number
of advantages to both litigants and the court. It achieves optimal efficiency by avoiding excessive interference with the activities of business while also avoiding excessive deference to
employers. 244 Unlike the business necessity standard used in
Title VII cases, the B < PL formula would not require an employer to engage in alternative business practices whenever a

241. See Kaminshine, supra note 168, at 281 ("The 'significantly serve' requirement also would preclude an employer from justifying a seniority-salary
criterion solely on grounds of convenience and cheapness of administration.").
242. See id. at 268-70 (noting the value that comes from an older worker's
experience and maturity).
243. See id. at 269-70 ("[W]orkers generally are paid less than the value of
their marginal product during the early periods of employment; this disparity
is said to disappear over time as the worker receives more pay, seniority, benefits, and privileges.").
244. Some might argue that employers who take excessive precautions in
avoiding discriminatory impacts will be bogged down by inefficiency, presupposing that a truly efficient model might even impose sanctions upon employers who provided a super optimal level of care. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique
of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 795 (1990) ("Tort law penalizes victims who
choose too little safety by reducing or barring recovery, but it fails to punish
those who choose too much although their behavior is just as inefficient.").
This is untrue, however, because employers implementing policies with potentially discriminatory impact have no incentive to adopt excessive precautions.
Doing so would only impose extra costs and offer no savings.
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disparate impact arises. 24 5 Instead it offers flexibility in decision making so long as the practice arising from the RFOA does
not rise above the external costs associated with the consequence of relying upon that factor. 246 Accordingly, the framework would generate incentives to think creatively about ways
to strike an appropriate balance between minimizing discrimination and maximizing profitability. This flexibility is tempered by a fair degree of predictability for employers. With a
common sense formula offering guidance as to when reliance on
a given factor will be permissible, employers will be better able
to avoid the likelihood of a lawsuit in the first place. 2 4 7 Being
both legally coherent and familiar, the Hand formula would
24 8
tend towards predictability for courts as well.
CONCLUSION
The history of disparate impact under the ADEA has been
a turbulent one. Curiously, however, as application of the
theory to age discrimination has developed over time, its availability to victims has simultaneously narrowed in scope. In
search for a standard to evaluate an employer's reliance on a
factor other than age, a familiar approach appears to have been
overlooked. Judge Hand's B < PL formula is one that is recognizable to courts and well within the capability of the trier of
fact.
Adoption of such a standard would not necessitate a revisitation of the Supreme Court's holdings in Smith or Meacham. 249 Rather, a cost-benefit evaluation is an appropriate and
245. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat.
1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2006)) (stating that
the alternative practices "demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii)
[§ 2000e-2(k)(1)] shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4,
1989, with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice."').
246. See Black, supra note 197, at 318 ("A modified [disparate impact]
standard permits defendants to continue their course of action so long as they
can establish an acceptable explanation for it.").
247. There is abundant evidence that employers are already cognizant of
the need to exercise care in dealing with disparate impacts. See generally
McWilliams & Patel, supra note 216, at 59-61 (offering guidance for employers engaged in reductions-in-force).
248. See POSNER, supra note 223, at 182.
249. The Court stated in Meacham that "a reasonable factor may lean more
heavily on older workers, as against younger ones, and an unreasonable factor
might do just the opposite." Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct.
2395, 2403-04 (2008). The Court added that it is "now satisfied that the business necessity test should have no place in ADEA disparate-impact cases." Id.
Yet neither statement precludes application of Judge Hand's B < PL formula
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logical interpretation of the "reasonableness" of an employer's
proffered factor other than age. 250 The standard would be one
that balances the needs of employers' to make necessary costreductions with the threat of economic exploitation faced by
older workers. Our developing understanding of age discrimination and the present economic situation demand a fair and
workable standard that gives meaning to the Court's decisions
in Smith and Meacham and makes disparate impact claims
truly available to victims of age discrimination.

to the RFOA defense. Under Hand's formula, a reasonable factor may still lean
more heavily on older workers, so long as the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Hand's formula is also categorically distinct from the business-necessity
test, because reliance on age need not meet any particular degree of jobrelatedness or financial necessity-the benefits must simply outweigh the
costs.
250. The Court adopted another restrictive interpretation of the ADEA in
its most recent decision on the subject. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (holding that the burden does not shift to an employer
in an ADEA claim to demonstrate that the action would have been taken regardless of age, "even when plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was
a motivating factor in the decision"). The case, however, addressed only the
disparate treatment theory of recovery, and not disparate impact. In Meacham, the Court explicitly stated it was only interpreting the RFOA defense
and not the statutory "because of" language addressed in Gross. Meacham,
128 S. Ct. at 2403 ("Reasonableness is a justification categorically distinct
from the factual condition 'because of age' and not necessarily correlated with
it in any particular way."). As pointed out by the dissent in Gross, the reasoning underlying the two rulings is also inconsistent. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the Wards Cove disparate-impact framework that
Congress flatly repudiated in the Title VII context continues to apply to ADEA
claims, the mixed-motives framework that Congress substantially endorsed
surely applies."). There is no reason to believe that the Court's restrictive interpretation of mixed-motive claims under the ADEA has any bearing on
standards used for evaluating the RFOA defense.

